One was a sprawling complex of mosques, religious schools, and community centres that offered education and health services. Another was a walled compound, its skyline punctuated by minarets and simple residential quarters built around a central mosque and seminary.
Two others were modest places of worship, and two more were small neighbourhood madrasas nestled within dense urban sprawl.
These were the locations struck by Indian forces in the early hours of Wednesday, in a series of coordinated air strikes launched across the Pakistani border.
The strikes followed a deadly attack in Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir that claimed the lives of 26 tourists. In its aftermath, New Delhi pledged a decisive response, blaming Pakistan-based militant networks.
Indian officials later identified the targets as training facilities operated by the proscribed (in Pakistan) groups Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM).
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During an all-party meeting held in New Delhi on Thursday, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh claimed that over 100 terrorists were killed inside Pakistan as part of the operation codenamed “Operation Sindoor” by the Indian government.
Pakistani officials say at least 31 people were killed in 26 Indian strikes on six locations overnight on Wednesday.
However, emerging evidence and expert analysis suggest that India’s air strikes were based on outdated intelligence, raising doubts about their strategic impact.
Locations targeted
The Indian air strikes reportedly targeted a series of sites in Pakistan linked to JeM and LeT, both of which have a history of operating from religious seminaries and mosques.
In Bahawalpur, a major city in Punjab province, a compound associated with JeM founder Masood Azhar was struck, resulting in the deaths of 13 people, among them ten members of Azhar’s own family. This incident marked the most lethal strike in the operation.
In another raid, Indian jets targeted a building in Muridke, approximately 40 kilometres from Lahore, which once served as LeT’s headquarters. Three people were reportedly killed. Pakistani authorities noted that the complex had been under state control since 2019, following the banning of LeT’s front group, Jamaat-ud-Dawa.
‘These facilities have been inactive for over a decade. The strikes indicate that India may still be relying on intelligence from the 1990s and early 2000s’
– Majid Nizami, analyst
Other Indian strikes were carried out on smaller seminaries and mosques formerly linked to militant activities in Punjab and Pakistan-administered Kashmir.
Despite the scale of these operations, no known militants were confirmed killed. The majority of those who lost their lives were civilians, Middle East Eye has confirmed from various sources, including residents, officials, and members of the militant groups.
Muhammad Feyyaz, a Lahore-based scholar specialising in terrorism trends in South Asia, suggested that the choice of targets indicates India may have acted on longstanding perceptions of militant group affiliations rather than current intelligence.
“It is plausible that these strikes were largely symbolic, aimed at sites long suspected of militant links, even if they no longer held operational value,” he told MEE.
Feyyaz said the strikes serve a dual purpose for India: reinforcing its narrative on Pakistan’s alleged support for militant outfits to an international audience, and consolidating domestic political support ahead of key electoral contests.
“Furthermore, India has generated widespread hysteria following the recent [Pahalgam] attack, making the air strike an almost inevitable response,” he added.
Majid Nizami, a Lahore-based analyst studying extremist groups in the region, said that the attacks on the locations were symbolically important because the LeT and JeM used them in the past as bases, rather than actually targeting any militant training centres.
“These facilities have been inactive for over a decade. The strikes indicate that India may still be relying on intelligence from the 1990s and early 2000s,” Nizami told MEE.
This mirrors a broader pattern of targeted killings inside Pakistan since 2019, often aimed at former militants allegedly involved in 1990s-era attacks, such as the 1999 Indian Airlines hijacking.
Pakistani officials compare these actions to India’s alleged covert operations abroad, including the killing of Sikh separatists in Canada, claims India denies.
Changed landscape
Pakistan has consistently denied providing state-sponsored support for militancy in Indian-administered Kashmir, though it has occasionally acknowledged backing militant groups during the 1990s.
Following a recent attack in Indian-administrated Kashmir, Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif reiterated that groups like LeT are now defunct, with members either detained or inactive, and therefore incapable of planning operations from Pakistan-administered territory.
Nizami said that Pakistan’s support for the Kashmir militancy began to shift during the tenure of former military ruler Pervez Musharraf, driven by multiple factors, including growing pressure from the United States post-9/11.
In 2002, Islamabad officially banned LeT, JeM and other groups linked to militancy. Simultaneously, enhanced Indian border surveillance made cross-border infiltration increasingly difficult.
“Some disbanded members eventually joined more extreme outfits, including the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and in later years, local affiliates of the Islamic State and al-Qaeda,” said Muhammad Hafeez, a former JeM member based in Karachi.
“They even attempted to target Musharraf in retaliation for his harsh crackdown on these groups.”
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Further pressure came from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which placed Pakistan on its grey list, prompting authorities to seize militant groups’ assets and restrict their leadership in 2019.
Experts note that a new phase of militancy emerged after the 2016 killing of Burhan Wani, a 22-year-old militant in Indian-administered Kashmir who had gained popularity through social media.
“His death ignited a wave of homegrown radicalisation,” Hafeez told MEE, adding that Wani’s successor, Zakir Musa, marked a clear ideological shift.
“Musa abandoned the pro-Pakistan narrative and aligned with al-Qaeda’s global jihadist ideology,” Hafeez said. Musa was later killed by Indian forces in 2019.
The situation further worsened after India’s 5 August 2019 decision to revoke constitutional provisions that had granted special autonomy to Indian-administered Kashmir.
“On the Indian side, LeT and other Pakistani groups saw a further decline in local support, allegedly due to Pakistan’s restrained reaction to India’s move, likely influenced by pressure from the FATF and the US,” Hafeez said.
“At the same time, within Pakistan, a youth-led popular movement demanding greater rights [in Pakistan-administered Kashmir] has emerged as an increasing challenge for Islamabad,” he added.
However, Indian and western analysts believe that Pakistan continues to provide limited support to anti-India militant networks.
“LeT and JeM are no longer overtly visible on the militant front, nor do their activities attract large crowds in madrassas as they once did,” a western diplomat in Islamabad who monitors regional stability, told MEE.
He noted, however, that the evolving nature of militancy has led to changes in operational strategy.
“Rather than assembling hundreds of fighters, groups may now focus on training small cells – sometimes as few as five to ten individuals – operating discreetly, even within local mosques.”
Ebbs and flows
The roots of the Kashmir conflict trace back to the 1947 partition of British India, which led to the creation of two new countries: predominantly Hindu India and predominantly Muslim Pakistan.
According to the partition plan, Muslim-majority regions were expected to join Pakistan. However, Kashmir, a Muslim-majority region ruled by a Hindu monarch, presented a unique challenge.
In October 1947, the Maharaja acceded to India, prompting a military intervention by Pakistan and sparking the first Indo-Pakistani war. A United Nations-brokered ceasefire in 1949 established a ceasefire line, dividing Kashmir.
Subsequent wars in 1965 and 1971, including India’s intervention in Pakistan’s civil war and the creation of Bangladesh, redefined borders.
The ceasefire line eventually became the Line of Control (LoC), with India controlling approximately two-thirds of Kashmir and Pakistan the rest. But the dispute remains unresolved.
The militancy in Indian-administered Kashmir is widely believed to have begun in the late 1980s, primarily driven by local political discontent. The 1987 state elections, widely perceived as rigged, deepened frustration among Kashmiri youth.
“A mostly indigenous insurgency emerged, but over the next few years it was co-opted by certain Pakistan-based groups,” said Jalaluddin Mughal, a journalist from Pakistan-administered Kashmir who covers the conflict closely.
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In its initial stages, Pakistan supported the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which launched an armed struggle in 1989.
However, the JKLF’s agenda, seeking an independent Kashmir free from both India and Pakistan, did not align with Pakistan’s strategic interests. After realising that JKLF’s demand for a “free and democratic Kashmir” posed a challenge to its regional policy, Pakistan began marginalising pro-independence factions and supporting Islamist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), experts note.
By the 1990s, Pakistan was providing logistical support, including training and arms, to various militant groups operating in Kashmir. This involvement was later acknowledged by senior Pakistani figures, including former President Musharraf.
Following the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Islamabad faced international pressure to curb cross-border militancy. In 2002, Pakistan banned groups like LeT and JeM, though LeT continued to operate under front organisations such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa, which is also now banned.
A ceasefire followed, and a peace process with India was launched.
By the early 2000s, at least 12 militant groups were active under the United Jihad Council.
“Now, only LeT and JeM remain, though their visibility has diminished significantly,” said Muhammad Hafeez, a former JeM supporter based in Karachi.
Many other factions have disbanded or disappeared.
The peace process ultimately collapsed after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which were attributed to LeT, reigniting tensions between India and Pakistan.
