The UK, Japan and Italy are turbocharging their sixth-generation Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) stealth fighter ambitions in a race to outpace China’s fast-rising and now battle-proven airpower.
The South China Morning Post (SCMP) recently reported that GCAP’s acceleration reflects growing concern over China’s growing edge in military technology. That was on display in the recent India-Pakistan skirmishes, where Pakistan’s Chinese-made fighters reportedly downed at least one of India’s French-made Rafales.
Brigadier General Edoardo de Santo of Italy’s Leonardo SpA, the lead Italian partner in the tri-national venture, defended the decade-long project at the Defence and Security Equipment International conference held this month near Tokyo, stating it was essential for confronting future threats.
Formalized in 2023, GCAP is set to deliver a fighter by 2035 that surpasses fifth-generation aircraft like the F-35 in stealth, sensor integration and battlefield coordination, effectively serving as an airborne command hub for drones and networked assets.
With each partner, Leonardo, BAE Systems (UK), and Japan’s JAIEC (Japan Aircraft Industrial Enhancement Co.), holding equal stakes in a new UK-based joint firm, the program is positioned to replace both the Eurofighter Typhoon and Japan’s F-2 jets. While specific costs remain undisclosed, the UK has already committed 14 billion pounds (US$19 billion).
Recent reports indicate Saudi Arabia may join the program, with Australia and India viewed as potential export markets. De Santo emphasized the dual-use nature of the fighter’s advanced technologies, underscoring its strategic and economic significance.
To outpace China and remain relevant in the Indo-Pacific, the GCAP must deliver a survivable, long-range sixth-generation fighter without falling prey to past procurement failures, export pitfalls and geopolitical risks.
As to why sixth-generation aircraft would be essential in the Indo-Pacific, Justin Bronk mentions in a March 2025 article for the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) that such aircraft are essential in the theater due to the vast operational distances and the vulnerability of aerial refueling assets.
Bronk emphasizes that such aircraft need to operate securely beyond missile threats, thereby reducing reliance on susceptible tankers. He says that their significant fuel capacity and weapons bays enable longer missions and sophisticated munitions use.
Additionally, he says their robust electronic warfare suites are built to counter network disruptions, ensuring effectiveness in contested environments.
Adding urgency to GCAP’s timeline, some reports speculate that China may already be testing sixth-generation designs, such as the three-engine J-36 and tailless lambda-wing J-50. However, much remains unknown about these aircraft.
GCAP still faces significant hurdles. A January 2025 UK House of Commons report warns that the program must avoid pitfalls that plagued past efforts, particularly the Eurofighter Typhoon, and that expanding international participation must not jeopardize the ambitious 2035 timeline.
The report highlights that exportability would be the key to GCAP’s success while acknowledging the need to transition the Eurofighter Typhoon workforce and prevent the cost-death spiral and delays associated with previous multilateral defense projects.
In an April 2023 RUSI article, Bronk argues that if GCAP’s financial support proves inadequate, the UK should scale down its ambitions and instead pursue a smaller, more affordable fleet of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs).
In terms of exportability, Bronk points out that the GCAP program is unlikely to produce a viable competitor to the F-35 for export markets, considering US defense giant Lockheed Martin’s vastly larger funding and successful stealth aircraft programs such as the F-22 and F-117.
Bronk argues that despite its flaws, the F-35 still holds a significant edge in capability. He contends that even if GCAP succeeds, it will likely face competition from upgraded “fifth-generation-plus” variants of the F-35.
While GCAP is firmly rooted in UK-Japan-Italy cooperation, the consortium has explored opportunities to broaden its base. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Australia and India have emerged as potential partners or future customers, each with different motivations, strategic priorities and integration challenges.
As for letting Saudi Arabia into the GCAP program, Bilal Saab argues in a January 2025 Breaking Defense article that access to Saudi capital could cover costs, shorten export timelines, generate revenue through sales and ease the financial burden on the UK, Italy and Japan.
In line with that, Shigeto Kondo writes in a September 2023 Afkar article that Saudi Arabia, given its large defense budget, is sure to place a large order for the GCAP if the project pushes through.
Such sales, Kondo notes, would secure the fighter market in the Middle East and prevent competitors like China and Russia from gaining a foothold in the region through fighter sales.
However, Alessandro Marrone warns in a March 2025 article for the Institute of International Affairs (IAI) that allowing Saudi Arabia to join GCAP poses several risks that could undermine the delicate trilateral balance between the UK, Italy and Japan.
Marrone notes that as the program’s current governance structure relies on equal footing and shared sovereignty over core technologies, Saudi Arabia’s inclusion, even as a junior partner, could strain decision-making and dilute existing industrial and strategic equities.
He observes that politically, Saudi Arabia’s controversial human rights record and unpredictable strategic behavior could raise reputational concerns and complicate export controls, especially for Japan, which recently revised its restrictive arms export laws with great caution.
In addition, he says the integration of Saudi-specific requirements could complicate GCAP’s design and delay its already ambitious 2035 deadline.
Beyond Saudi Arabia, other countries have expressed varying degrees of interest in GCAP. For instance, National Defense Magazine reported in March 2025 that senior Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) officers requested information about the aircraft as its F/A-18 Super Hornets and EA-18G Growler fleet ages and next-generation capabilities mature.
However, the report notes that there are still too many unknowns about the GCAP, and it wouldn’t be possible to present the Australian government with a list of options at this time. Also, Australia is already heavily integrated with the US defense industrial base, with a fifth-generation-plus F-35 being a feasible option over the GCAP.
Meanwhile, Japan has also reached out to India about potential participation in GCAP. According to an April 2025 The Mainichi report, Japanese officials proposed India’s involvement in GCAP during a February visit.
The report notes that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s administration expressed interest, viewing the proposal as consistent with its “Make in India” policy aimed at strengthening domestic arms production.
However, India’s longstanding weapons dependency on Russia would likely hinder its participation in the GCAP program. India operates Su-30MKI fighter jets and S-400 air defense systems, which pose a threat to the GCAP’s classified technologies, especially if Russian-origin systems must interoperate within a shared architecture, an issue that could risk inadvertent technology leakage.
Ultimately, GCAP’s success will hinge not only on technical breakthroughs but also on lessons learned from past failures, political will and the strength of its partnerships. In an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific, the GCAP’s success and relevance may prove to be less about technology and more about alignment.
